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How would population growth affect investment in the future? Asymmetric 
panel causality evidence for Africa 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Our generation is experiencing the greatest demographic transition and Africa is at the center 
of it. There is mounting concern over corresponding rising unemployment and depleting per 
capita income. We examine the issues in this paper from a long-run perspective by assessing 
the relationships among population growth and a plethora of investment dynamics: public, 
private, foreign and domestic investments. Using asymmetric panels from 38 countries with 
data spanning from 1977 to 2007, our findings reveal a long-run positive causal linkage from 
population growth to only public investment. But for domestic investment, permanent 
fluctuations in human capital affect permanent changes in other forms of investments. 
Robustness checks on corresponding short-run Granger causality analysis and the long-run 
‘physical capital led investment’ nexus are consistent with the predictions of economic theory. 
As a policy implication, population growth may strangle only public finances in the long-run. 
Hence, the need for measures that encourage family planning and create a conducive 
investment climate (and ease of doing business) for private and foreign investments. 
Seemingly, structural adjustments policies implemented by sampled countries may not have 
the desired investment effects in the distant future.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The emergence of Africa in the world as one of the continents with the highest 
demographic growth rate with a population projected to double by 2036 and represent 20% of 
the world by 2050 (UN Worlds Population Prospects, 2009), presents an important geo-
economic concern to policy-makers, researchers and social scientists. The issue is even more 
crucial with rising unemployment rate and soaring economic emigration (Tom, 2006; Asongu, 
2012ab). This has reignited renewed interest in the problem of long-run investment 
opportunities. The continuous expansion of demography raises important policy questions
1
, 
especially on the exhaustion of investment opportunities needed to accommodate rising 
unemployment owing to population surge (Seya 1989
2
; Adu-Nyako & Lele, 1991
3
; Shields et 
al., 2010). Socioeconomic unrests that have marked the African geopolitical landscape in 
recent years have been largely due to high unemployment rates (Sakbani, 2011; Mohammad, 
2011). Economists in effect may no longer be thinking about the outer limits of capital 
accumulation and demand-side advantages of population growth. The unparalleled projection 
of population growth, coupled with the substantially documented investment needs of the 
African continent
4
  raise important policy questions about the sources of future investment 
opportunities that would manage unemployment.  
Beside the interesting policy relevance of this topic, in light of above facts and recent 
geopolitical climate in Africa, economists have learned to take awkward questions of Laymen 
in the street seriously: “What is it about additional people that make them a stimulus to 
investment? On what sort of investments shall our children depend-on for future 
                                                 
1
 A substantial bulk of African development literature has been consistent on the need for policies that target the 
management of population growth (Vaidyanathan, 1992; Meekers & van de Walk, 1992; Desai, 1992; Eshete, 
1992; Hansen, 1992; Beghin, & Severyns, 1992; Johnston, 1992; Touré, 1992; Ohadike, 1992).  
2
 Seya (1989, p.1)  had advocated that, unchecked population growth may lead to serious social and economic 
burdens in developing countries in general and Africa in particular. 
3
 Effectively dealing with population growth is one of the three priorities for an integrated strategy of poverty 
alleviation in Africa (p.1).  
4
 Many recent studies in the African business literature have focused on factors determining investment (Rolfe & 
Woodward, 2004; Alagidede, 2008; Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi , 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Darley, 2012; 
Asongu, 2012c).  
 4 
employment? Shall the government cope with the rising population?” These idle questions 
have recently exerted a substantial weight on the world’s geopolitical and politico-economic 
landscapes
5
.   
In raising the issue of long-run employment opportunities, this paper has a twofold 
contribution to the African development literature. Firstly, the long-term focus of the analysis 
adequately calibrates the projected demographic issue in the distant future. Secondly, by 
assessing the connections between demographic changes and investment dynamics, we are 
able to provide the investment trends that policy makers need to focus-on to tackle potential 
long-term unemployment
6
. The distinction between public, private, foreign and domestic 
investment dynamics in the analysis addresses important questions on government (public 
versus private investment) and openness (foreign versus domestic investment) policies. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the literature on linkages among 
population growth, investment and economic growth. Data and methodology are discussed 
and presented respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 “The premises of the Arab Spring and hitherto unanswered questions about some of its dynamics could be 
traced to poverty; owing to unemployment and rising food prices. “We will take to the streets in demonstrations  
or we will steal,” a 30-year old Egyptian woman in 2008 vented her anger  as she stood outside a bakery. Riots  
and demonstrations linked to soaring consumer prices took place in over 30 countries between 2007-08. The 
Middle East encountered food riots in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Yemen. In Ivory Coast, thousands marched 
to the  home of President then Laurent Gbagbo chanting: “you are going to kill us”,“ we are hungry”, “life is 
too expensive” …etc. Similar demonstrations followed in  many other African countries, including , Cameroon, 
Senegal, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Mauritania and Guinea. In Latin America, violent clashes and 
demonstrations over rising food prices occurred in Guatemala, Peru, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico 
and the Haitian prime minister was even toppled following food riots. In Asia, people flooded the streets in 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand, India and the Philippines. Even North Korea surprisingly experienced an 
incident in which market women gathered to protest against restrictions on their ability to trade in food. The 
geopolitical landscape in the last couple of months has also revolved around the inability of some political 
regimes to implement concrete policies that  ensure the livelihoods of their citizens. Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, 
Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, Mauritania, Sudan, Western Sahara and most recently Nigeria are some countries 
that have witnessed major or minor unrests via techniques of civil resistance in sustained campaigns involving 
strikes, demonstrations, marches and rallies” (Asongu, 2012d).  
6
It is an established consensus that, the three main things Africa needs are investment, investment and 
investment (Dangote Group, 2008; IMF Survey, 2009).  
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2. Population growth, investment and economic growth: theory and evidence  
2.1 The concern for population growth and need for investment in Africa 
 There has been growing concern over Africa’s population growth and corresponding 
rising unemployment rate. With the population projected to double by 2036, many proponents 
have it that, if stringent investment policies are not put in place, socio-economic issues related 
to rising unemployment and decreasing per capita would increase social unrests, brain drain 
and/or illegal migration.  
 According to the World Bank, our generation is experiencing the greatest demographic 
change ever, with Africa at its center. From the United Nations estimates, in the post colonial 
era (around 1970), there were two Europeans for every African. By the time those born in the 
1970s go on retirement (2030) it is projected that, there would be two Africans for every 
European. These statistics make Africa the fastest growing continent with its population 
estimated to represent 20% of the world by 2050 (UN Worlds Population Prospects, 2009). 
Therefore, the concern of knowing how this soaring population could be accomondated 
without bitter economic implications is quite paramount. In an attempt to find a solution to 
this growing concern, many analysts (directly or indirectly) are in support of the thesis that 
African needs other forms of investments owing to the failed privatization projects (Rolfe & 
Woodward, 2004; Alagidede, 2008; Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi , 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; 
Darley, 2012; Asongu, 2012c). Dangote Group (2008) has emphasized that Africa needs 
investments not aid. It has decried the rejection of products from African companies by 
multinationals and urged African companies to target inter-African trade. This pressing 
investment need is supported by a recent IMF Survey (April 2009) in which many analysts 
believe foreign donors should focus more on investment avenues in Africa, than on aid. 
Development assistance and aid would improve per capita, but sustainable investment could 
 6 
benefit the continent more in the long run
7
.  Though private and foreign investments in Africa 
have surged over the past years
8
, rising unemployment rates remain crucial. With structural 
adjustment policies imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (requiring 
liberalization, privatization and meandering towards market based economies in the 1980s), 
we should expect foreign and private investments to increase with population growth at the 
expense of public investment. 
 A strand of current issues in African business has focused on the need to improve 
Africa’s share of foreign direct investment (FDI). Rolfe & Woodward (2004) have examined 
the Zambian experience of attracting foreign investment through privatization. Findings have 
shown that, despite increased foreign-investment during the 1990s, the economy has 
stagnated. They conclude that, having sold-off its state assets, Zambia (like other sub-Saharan 
African (SSA)) countries must endeavor to attract investment through other channels. Much 
recently, Bartels et al. (2009) have assessed the reason SSA’s FDI share has persistently 
averaged 1% of global flows and concluded that, FDI ‘location decision’ in SSA is influenced 
strongly by policy issues
9
. As a broad extension of this analysis, using microdata and firm 
interviews to explore the role of FDI drivers in South Africa, Tuomi (2011) has used a micro 
level analysis (which enables specification of the investment climate constraints) and has also 
found the impediments to investment to be centered around wrong-policy. A stance further 
confirmed by Kolstad & Wiig (2011) and Darley (2012) in their investigations of Chinese 
FDI in Africa and how to increase SSA’s share of FDI respectively. Two insights relevant to 
the context of this paper could be drawn from the above literature: (1) the need for alternative 
                                                 
7
 The peril of foreign aid has been confirmed in recent African institutional (Asongu, 2012ef) and development 
(Asongu, 2012g) literature.  
8
 Foreign capital investments for example have surged from $15 billion in 2000 to $87 billion in 2007.  
9
 Motivated by the intuition that location decision and perceptions of investors are very instructive in policy 
making, they have analyzed a survey of perceptions, operations and motivations of 758 foreign investors in 10 
SSA countries. Their results demonstrate that, the provision of transaction cost-reducing information on 
industries and markets on the one hand and utility services to investors on the other hand , before and after a 
firm’s FDI decision are significant factors. 
 7 
sources of employment (or investment) beside FDI and; (2) the important role of policy 
making bodies in determining investment flows.  
 
2.2 Population growth, human capital investments and investment opportunities  
 This section will be discussed in three strands: the first analyzes the debate on the 
linkages among population growth, human capital and investment opportunities; the second 
examines the relationship between population growth and investment opportunities and; the 
third assesses the debate on linkages between population growth and economic development.  
In the first strand, it is essential to investigate how the soaring population will be 
accommodated by future investment dynamics because among the striking regularities, it is 
evident in aggregate cross-country data (whether examined cross-sectionally or over-time)  
that, there are inverse associations between fertility rates and ‘per capita incomes,  indicators 
of human capital, schooling levels and survival rates’. As a general rule, high-income 
countries have been (and are) characterized by low fertility and high-levels of human capital 
(Rosenzweig, 1990). Indeed, those countries that have experienced high rates of per capita 
income growth have also experienced relatively rapid declines in fertility and increases in 
human capital levels
10
. Hence, it could be inferred that, declines in fertility and increases in 
human capital levels accompany economic development. Such aggregate linkages by 
themselves do not reveal very much about the determinants of economic growth and human 
capital investments. In fact, it has frequently been stated that the declining rate of population 
growth was one of the major contributing causes for the failure of the American economy to 
recover fully from depression in the 1930s (Rosenson, 1942). It is probably factual that, in a 
                                                 
10
 It is widely believed that, as income grows, families tend to prefer the quality of children to their quantity. 
Borrowing from Hasan (2010), per capita growth in China tends to lower population growth. He quotes the 
Becker hypothesis in supporting his findings: “…as per capita income increases, families turn to prefer quality 
over quantity of children. The resultant increase in the cost of bearing and rearing children would induce smaller 
family size and lead to decline in fertility” (page 360). Another explanation to this phenomenon could be seen 
from Pommeret & Smith (2005) who conclude that, growth rates are negatively correlated with birth rates due to 
production volatility. Thus with development, productivity volatility affects the growth rate of an economy by 
altering both saving decisions and decisions to have children. 
 8 
boom period of rapid expansion and increasing population, a sudden decrease in the rate of 
population growth would tend to make investors more cautious.  Indeed, increasing rate of 
population growth might influence investors to be pessimistically inclined to feel that, such an 
increase will cause more absolute unemployment and economic hardship in a country, so that 
investment prospects are less profitable. On the other hand, with an increasing rate of 
population, expectations of entrepreneurs change so that they turn to believe certain 
investments to be profitable. As investors increase their optimism, investment and 
unemployment increases and decreases respectively.  
There are several ways in which population growth might influence investment in the 
second strand (Sweezy, 1940): (1) through its effect on the propensity to consume; (2) 
through its effect on the competition of aggregate consumer demand; (3) by means of supply 
of labour and; (4) as an essential part of a certain broader phenomenon which in turn vitally 
affects investment.  Firstly, a population containing a high proportion of dependents may be 
expected to have a relatively high propensity to consume. To a considerable extent, this factor 
cuts both ways (so far as population is concerned). Whereas a rapidly growing population has 
a high proportion of children, a stationary population has a high proportion of people beyond 
working age. However, from sociological and political standpoints, the two situations differ 
considerably. Undoubtedly, a high proportion of dependent in the older age group presents 
much more a problem for the public than a high proportion of children. Moreover, during the 
transition period from rapid growth to complete stability, the population goes through a point 
where the combined proportion of dependents is at a minimum. Secondly, the effect of 
population growth on the composition of total consumer demand is important for investment 
opportunity. In fact, a growing population of necessity directs a relatively large proportion of 
its expenditure towards commodities which require relatively heavy capital outlays for their 
production. Thirdly, so far we have been considering the effect of population growth on the 
 9 
demand for commodities and therefore, indirectly on the outlets for investment seeking funds. 
More direct is the effect of population growth on the labour supply. Indeed, this is the aspect 
of the concern that has interested classical economists and the usual treatment stems directly 
from their work. Fourthly, the above points have been asking what the effects of population 
growth on investment and employment would be. From a wider perspective, the link between 
population growth and investment is an essential part of a certain broader phenomenon. It is 
scarcely possible to conceive this linkage as occurring in isolation because; they are 
intimately bound with other factors (like technological change and progress in health care).  
 The third strand on linkages between population growth and economic development 
has been an issue of much heated debate. While some proponents view positive demographic 
change as an instigator of long-run growth, others express ambivalence over this relationship.  
The contribution of population growth to economic development has been addressed in many 
studies. Azomahou & Mishra (2008) in revisiting the impact of age dynamics on economic 
growth through age-structured population for OECD
11
 and non OECD countries have shown 
that (between 1960 and 2000), said economies grew mostly due to the stock of human capital. 
In comparative terms, findings reveal non OECD countries are likely to enjoy higher growth 
than their OECD counterparts. Moreso, the age-dynamics side of the study reinforces the 
consensus that, age-structured population especially the work force is important in explaining 
differences in growth between OECD and non OECD countries. Much earlier, Hondroyiannis 
& Papapetrou (2005), in a study on the relationship between fertility and output in eight 
European countries (using panel cointegration analysis) had established that, in the long-run 
(based on data from 1960 through 1998) increase in output per capita would be associated 
with higher fertility. This confirms the thesis of proponents who acknowledge that, the current 
low fertility rate in Europe is having a toll on European economic growth. Contrary to this 
                                                 
11
 OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
 10 
well established positive link between birth rate and growth rate, the concern as to why many 
poor countries with high birth rates reflect low growth rates remains puzzling and has been 
explained through classical and modern theories. Malthusian and neo-Malthusian theories 
explain the relation between population growth and economic development through depletion 
of per capita income. This is the direct consequence of population growth increasing faster 
than GDP growth.  
 
3. Data and Econometric methodology 
 
3.1 Data  
 We examine a sample of 38 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators of the World Bank for the period 1977 to 2007. The limitation to only 38 countries 
is based on constraints in data availability. Aggregate investment dynamics include: Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI); Gross Private Investment (Private Ivt); Gross Public Investment 
(Public Ivt) and; Gross Domestic Investment (GDI). Factor productivity variables are: Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) for physical capital and Population growth rate (pop) for 
human capital. While the first five variables are in ratios of GDP, population growth is in 
annual growth rate. The thirty-eight countries making-up the initial dataset are subsequently 
trimmed-down due to constraints in the cointegration theory
12
. Hence, in the analysis, 
constituent countries of the panel-base differ as we move from one form of investment to 
another. The inclusion of physical capital (or fixed capital formation) in the analysis has a 
twofold justification: firstly, it serves as a control variable for robustness checks (in the 
                                                 
12
 For long-run elasticities to be estimated for a given country, factor productivity proxies must be integrated in 
the first order and cointegrated with investment variables. While integration requires exhibition of unit root in 
level series (and therefore stationarity in first differenced series), cointegration necessitates showing that, 
permanent changes in factor productivity variables affect permanent variations in investment proxies and vice- 
versa.  
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verification of the ‘capital led investment’ nexus) and; secondly, it is in line with the 
mainstream aggregate production investment specification
13
.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
The estimation strategy typically follows mainstream literature on testing the effects of 
monetary policy variables on output and prices (Starr, 2005; Nogueira, 2009). The technique 
involves units root and cointegration tests that assess the stationarity properties and long-term 
relationships (equilibriums) respectively. In these investigations, the Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) is applied for long-run effects while simple Granger causality is used for 
short-term effects. Whereas application of the former model requires that the variables exhibit 
unit roots in levels (and have a long-run relationship (cointegration)), the latter is applied on 
the condition that variables do not exhibit unit roots (or are stationary).  
  
4. Causality estimations 
 
 Based on the Engle-Granger (1987) methodology, short-run estimations and long-run 
estimators will be derived by simple Granger causality and Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
models respectively.  
                                                 
13
 Starting with the aggregate investment production function: 
WAKI                                                                                                      (A) 
where I is the investment variable,  A  is total factor productivity, K is capital stock, and W is the labour 
composite, which is determined by the rate of population growth . We can re-write Eq. A in the natural log form 
in per capita terms as: 
WKI logloglog                                                                                           (B) 
In the investment production function, physical capital is measured by gross fixed capital formation and human 
capital by population growth rate. To take account of the panel nature of our study, we can hence re-reformulate 
Eq. B  in per capita form for country   i at time t as: ititititit wkI logloglog     
There are several channels through which human capital could improve investment. An investor would consider 
the cost of labour as a production factor before a decision to invest in a given region. The cost of labour is 
determined by its availability. From common sense and to some extend economic theory (demand and supply), 
countries with high growth rates in working force would ‘ceteris paribus’ have low working wage. It follows 
that, growth in work force should lead to cheaper labour cost, more investment and consequently higher 
economic growth. Thus, as hypothetically specified in Eq. (A), there is a positive relationship between stated 
productivity factors and investment types. This theoretical lay-out is synonymous to the positive dependence of 
aggregate production (GDP) on mentioned productivity factors and is supported empirically by many an author 
(Azomahou & Mishra, 2008; Hondroyiannis & Papapetrou, 2005). Concerning short-run effects, we don’t expect 
results to be significant because, we hypothetically assume population growth should impact investment 
dynamics only in the long-term.  
 12 
 
4.1 Short run estimations 
Let us consider a basic bivariate finite-order vector autoregression (VAR) model. As 
shown in Eqs. (1) and (2) below, short-run or simple granger causality is based on evaluating 
how respectively,  past values of physical capital (k) and human capital (w) could help past 
values of FDI in explaining  present values of FDI. While in mainstream literature the 
Granger causality model is applied on variables that are stationary (in levels for the most 
part), within the framework of this study, we are applying this test to all ‘investment and 
capital’ pairs in ‘first difference’ equations for three reasons: (1) ensure comparability; (2) 
consistency with application of the model to stationary variables and; (3) robustness checks in 
case we might have missed-out something in the unit root test specifications.  
In light of the above, the resulting VAR models in first difference are the following:  
 
tiijti
p
j
q
j
ijjtiijit kFDIFDI ,,
1 0
'
,   
 
                                      (1) 
 
tiijti
p
j
q
j
ijjtiijit wFDIFDI ,,
1 0
'
,   
 
                                     (2) 
 
 The null hypothesis of Eq. (2) is the stance that, population growth (human capital) 
does not Granger cause FDI. A rejection of this null hypothesis is captured by the significant 
F-statistics; which is the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis that estimated parameters of 
lagged values equal zero. Optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is consistent with the 
recommendations of Liew (2004)
14
.   
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 “The major findings in the current simulation study are previewed as follows. First, these criteria managed to 
pick up the correct lag length at least half of the time in small sample. Second, this performance increases 
substantially as sample size grows. Third, with relatively large sample (120 or more observations), HQC is 
found to outdo the rest in correctly identifying the true lag length. In contrast, AIC and FPE should be a better 
choice for smaller sample. Fourth, AIC and FPE are found to produce the least probability of under estimation 
among all criteria under study. Finally, the problem of over estimation, however, is negligible in all cases. The 
findings in this simulation study, besides providing formal groundwork supportive of the popular choice of AIC 
in previous empirical researches, may as well serve as useful guiding principles for future economic researches 
in the determination of autoregressive lag length” (Liew, 2004, p. 2). 
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4.2 Long run estimators 
 
 For long-run causality, let us consider foreign direct investment (FDI), physical capital 
(k), and human capital (w), with no lagged differences, such that: 
itit kFDI                                                                                                               (3) 
itit wFDI                                                                                                               (4) 
 Resulting VECMs are the following: 
ttitiit kFDIFDI ,11,1, )(                                                                    (5) 
ttitiit FDIkk ,21,1, )('                                                              (6) 
ttitiit wFDIFDI ,31,1, )(''                                                              (7)
 
ttitiit FDIww ,41,1, )('''                                                            (8) 
Eqs. (5) and (6) reflect short-term adjustments to the cointegration relation of Eq. (3) 
while Eqs. (7) and (8) mirror the adjustments to Eq. (4). The right hand terms are the ‘error 
correction terms’ (ECTs). At equilibrium, the value of this term is zero. When the ECT is 
non-zero, it implies FDI and ‘k’ or ‘w’ have deviated from the long-run equilibrium. Hence, 
the ECT helps each variable to adjust and partially restore the equation relation. The speeds of 
these adjustments are measured by α and α’ for FDI and physical capital respectively (Eqs. 5 
and 6).  We shall replicate the same models (3 and 4) for the other investment types. The 
same deterministic trend assumptions used for cointegration tests will be applied and 
goodness of fit in model specification will be based on the AIC
15
 (Liew, 2004).   
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Akaike Information Criterion.  
 14 
4.3 Derivation of integrated variables from country-specific unit root tests 
 
4.3.1 Country-specific unit root tests 
 In order to use the cointegration theory, we first test for stationarity properties at 
country levels. In doing so, we correct for serial correlations using the standard Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF)
16
 test. We do not elaborate on the mechanics of the unit root test because 
it is widely applied and constitutes only an exploratory analysis of the study. Optimal lag 
selection for goodness of fit in model specification is still in line with the recommendations of 
Liew (2004). Tables 1-2 below present the unit root test results. Country-specific variables 
with stationarity properties that are consistent with the cointegration theory are presented in 
bold. The choice of these countries depends on specific selection criteria; outlined in Section 
4.3.2 below.  
 
                                                 
16
 Dickey & Fuller (1979). 
 15 
Table 1: ADF Statistics for country-specific unit root tests (1977-2007)  
 
Countries 
Foreign Investment Private Investment Public Investment 
Level First difference Level First difference Level First difference 
c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
Algeria -2.992* -13.13*** n.a n.a -2.501 -3.190 -2.956* -2.881 -1.777 -1.722 -3.716*** -3.708** 
Benin -4.806*** -5.956**** n.a n.a -0.900 -2.553 -3.814** -3.838** -3.690** -3.647* n.a n.a 
Botswana  -2.248 -3.547* -7.304*** -7.171*** -2.583 -3.022 -3.336** -3.410* -3.128** -2.069 -4.336** -6.079*** 
Burundi -4.417*** -4.305** n.a n.a -2.058 -2.071 -5.711*** -5.590*** -1.853 -2.751 -6.145*** -6.005*** 
Cameroon -2.403 -2.402 -10.66*** -10.44*** -5.180*** -4.311*** n.a n.a -2.177 -3.007 -3.088** -3.035 
CAR -1.049 -10.39*** -4.223*** -3.894** -4.222*** -4.124** n.a n.a -3.464** -3.930** -6.938*** -7.195*** 
Chad -3.702** -3.308 -3.171** -2.717 -1.612 -2.545 -2.695* -2.528 -2.073 -2.340 -4.316*** -4.802*** 
Côte d’Iv. -2.133 -2.661 -7.098*** -6.970*** -2.328 -2.256 -9.711*** -4.365** -1.554 -2.008 -4.955*** -4.949*** 
Congo R. -0.995 -2.079 -4.660*** -3.639* -1.748 -1.229 -8.228*** -8.494*** -3.324** -3.264 -3.281** -3.416* 
Egypt -2.062 -0.858 -3.385** -3.555* -2.594 -2.515 -3.056** -3.021 -1.186 -4.171** -5.739*** -5.584*** 
Burkina F. -7.635*** -8.338*** n.a n.a -1.712 -3.022 -4.802*** -4.638*** -1.475 -2.443 -5.919*** -5.814*** 
Gabon -2.721* -2.651 -7.243*** -7.198*** -1.983 -2.889 -2.800* -2.778 -4.625*** -4.566*** -4.625*** -4.566*** 
Gambia 0.319 -1.888 -13.361*** -14.000*** -2.064 -2.457 -5.060*** -4.938*** -2.877* -3.129 -4.660*** -4.515*** 
Ghana -0.593 -3.096 -4.776*** -4.920*** 0.755 -4.865*** -5.705*** -5.817*** -2.364 -2.330 -3.498** -3.353* 
Guinea -2.849* -2.826 -3.801** -3.726* -1.801 -1.707 -4.392*** -4.348*** -0.576 -3.438* -6.727*** -7.292*** 
Kenya -3.966*** -4.701*** n.a n.a -1.314 -1.356 -5.578*** -5.762*** -1.653 -1.541 -4.276*** -4.251** 
Lesotho -3.119** -3.198 -6.795*** -6.697*** -1.279 -1.125 -4.190*** -4.385*** -2.052 -2.386 -4.038*** -3.837** 
Madagascar -0.990 -5.213*** -5.053*** -4.906*** 2.056 0.336 -6.365*** -3.985** -3.245** -3.573* -3.861*** -3.732** 
Malawi -3.424** -3.992** n.a n.a -2.014 -1.946 -5.941*** -5.832*** -2.570 -1.980 -4.908*** -5.806*** 
Mali -2.813* -3.646** n.a n.a -3.742** -4.841*** n.a n.a -2.649* -4.355** n.a n.a 
Morocco -1.434 -8.603*** -15.199*** -14.922*** 0.116 -2.320 -5.022*** -3.875** -3.817*** -2.959 -4.956*** -5.706*** 
Mozambique -1.924 -2.610 -4.535*** -4.469** -1.833 -1.553 -10.486*** -5.564*** -3.034** -3.288* n.a n.a 
Mauritania  -5.683*** -4.794*** n.a n.a -0.970 -3.269 -3.309* -3.542 -6.762*** -0.261 -3.444** -5.162** 
Mauritius -4.188*** -4.414*** n.a n.a -2.866* -2.898 -2.969** -2.890 -1.758 -1.485 -5.223*** -5.525*** 
Namibia -2.836* -4.079** n.a n.a -1.616 -3.869** -6.721*** -6.651*** -3.784*** -2.956 -7.717*** -8.387*** 
Niger -3.577** -3.468* n.a n.a 0.153 -1.056 -4.371*** -5.146*** -4.232*** -3.347* n.a n.a 
Rwanda  -0.721 0.281 n.s.a n.s.a -1.006 -1.843 -3.741** -3.635* -1.871 -2.323 -4.951*** -4.991*** 
South Africa -4.072*** -4.210** n.a n.a -3.233** -1.215 -4.555*** -5.331*** -3.401** -8.925*** n.a n.a 
Senegal -1.771 -5.327*** -10.147*** -10.042*** -2.394 -3.358* -6.470*** -6.367*** 2.193 0.471 -6.622*** -7.693*** 
Seychelles 1.173 -0.584 -1.721 -2.221 -2.627 -2.862 -5.399*** -5.324*** -4.070*** -3.752** n.a n.a 
Sierra Leone -4.986*** -5.432*** n.a n.a -2.146 -1.253 -7.489*** -8.351*** -3.457** -3.403* n.a n.a 
Sudan -0.836 -1.999 -2.515 -3.193 -2.471 -3.074 -5.591*** -5.461*** -1.052 0.267 -3.515** -4.469*** 
Swaziland  -3.953*** -3.932** n.a n.a -1.882 -4.716*** -5.570*** -5.739*** -3.237** -2.996 -10.754*** -10.734*** 
Togo -3.275** -3.206 -10.037*** -11.202*** -1.356 -2.764 -5.607*** -5.556*** -3.688** -4.169** n.a n.a 
Tunisia -3.638** -4.201** n.a n.a -5.087*** -4.992*** n.a n.a -1.952 -1.650 -3.872*** -3.810** 
Uganda 0.745 -1.647 -5.071*** -5.564*** -0.430 -3.607* -6.531*** -6.354*** -3.537** -3.585* n.a n.a 
Zambia -1.646 -4.351** -5.833*** -5.627*** -0.799 -1.606 -1.674 -1.922 -1.576 -1.389 -3.872** -3.697* 
Zimbabwe  -2.124 -2.381 -6.413*** -4.171*** -2.862* -2.986 -5.288*** -5.098*** -3.448** -3.547* n.a n.a 
*, **, ***: denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Maximum lag is 3 and optimal lags are chosen with the AIC. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. n.a: not applicable; n.s.a: not 
specifically applicable due to issues in degrees of freedom.  
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Table 2: ADF Statistics for country-specific unit root tests continued (1977-2007)  
 
Countries 
Domestic Investment Physical Capital Human Capital(Population growth) 
Level First difference Level First difference Level First difference 
c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
Algeria -2.853* -1.465 -2.901* -6.147*** -2.624 -2.100 -5.992*** -6.502*** -1.632 -1.825 -1.960 -2.123 
Benin -3.406** -3.549* n.a n.a -0.717 -8.603*** -8.045*** -7.778*** -2.097 -1.344 -8.902*** -9.263*** 
Botswana -2.574 -2.745 -3.820*** -3.853** -2.888* -3.550* n.a n.a -0.539 -2.806 -1.763 -1.494 
Burundi -1.390 -2.703 -7.960*** -7.813*** -1.747 -1.941 -6.800*** -6.687*** -3.580** -3.681** n.a n.a 
Cameroon -2.231 -1.670 -6.562*** -6.797*** -4.582*** -3.918** n.a n.a 2.257 -0.558 -1.089 -2.448 
CAR -3.458** -3.552* n.a n.a -3.774*** -3.772** n.a n.a -1.119 -2.339 -2.514 -3.093 
Chad -1.557 -3.646** -4.374*** -4.340** -1.641 -3.094 -3.893*** -3.801** -1.072 0.594 -0.015 -0.760 
Côte d’Iv. -1.831 -1.479 -4.469*** -4.746*** -1.786 -1.467 -5.279*** -5.810*** -1.166 -4.242** -3.326** -3.098 
Congo R. -2.626* -2.931 -4.527*** -4.436*** -2.607 -3.058 -4.552*** -4.471*** -1.131 -1.214 -2.813* -2.882 
Egypt -1.577 -3.397* -4.159*** -4.080** -2.112 -3.309* -5.121*** -4.995*** -1.567 -3.334* -2.155 -1.737 
Burkina F. -2.607 -2.591 -6.795*** -6.659*** -2.440 -2.540 -7.057*** -6.987*** -1.916 0.279 -1.268 -2.452 
Gabon -4.679*** -5.192*** n.a n.a -3.604** -4.003** n.a n.a -1.755 -2.397 -1.461 -0.971 
Gambia  -6.293*** -6.443*** n.a n.a -2.970* -2.951 -4.710*** -5.053*** -1.143 -1.553 -1.063 -6.523*** 
Ghana 0.693 -2.689 -6.230*** -6.482*** 0.518 -4.130** -5.783*** -5.936*** 0.689 -7.314*** -4.253*** -13.654*** 
Guinea -1.089 -2.281 -4.313*** -4.529*** -1.099 -2.429 -4.427*** -4.576*** -2.126 -2.591 -1.858 -1.834 
Kenya -2.951* -4.360*** n.a n.a -4.559*** -4.264** n.a n.a -1.286 -3.203 -2.379 -2.347 
Lesotho -1.418 -1.062 -5.029*** -5.079*** -1.358 -0.959 -5.260*** -5.012*** 0.247 -2.079 -1.439 -1.615 
Madagascar -0.666 -1.844 -6.443*** -6.589*** -0.175 -1.294 -4.984*** -5.086*** -2.804* -1.276 -1.420 -2.755 
Malawi -2.743* -2.721 -7.796*** -8.042*** -2.353 -2.173 -6.527*** -6.812*** -1.506 -2.249 -3.115** -3.083 
Mali -1.727 -3.703** -8.364*** -8.225*** -1.755 -3.714** -8.390*** -8.256*** -1.425 -4.472*** -2.688* -2.515 
Morocco  -2.197 -2.636 -6.075*** -4.151** -2.414 -2.845 -5.605*** -3.953** 9.587 17.212 6.654 -1.825 
Mozambique -2.632* -2.994 -4.386*** -4.814*** -2.632* -2.994 -4.386*** -4.814*** -2.199 -2.247 -2.074 -1.976 
Mauritania -1.798 -1.725 -8.590*** -8.442*** -4.263*** -4.263** n.a n.a -3.352** -0.473 0.722 1.593 
Mauritius -3.148** -3.078 -2.572 -2.499 -3.964*** -4.241** n.a n.a -2.106 -2.215 -5.884*** -5.787*** 
Namibia -3.792*** -3.797** n.a n.a -2.748* -3.426* n.a n.a -2.247 -2.351 -1.532 -1.050 
Niger -3.687** -1.413 -2.927* -3.957** -1.011 -2.356 -3.214** -4.414*** -1.786 1.899 0.707 0.138 
Rwanda -0.843 -1.908 -9.900*** -10.020*** -1.551 -2.661 -5.820 -6.028*** -2.588 -2.565 -2.479 -2.425 
South Africa -1.838 -1.486 -4.575*** -4.814*** -1.545 -0.106 -3.000** -3.665** -0.780 -2.345 -3.921*** -4.218** 
Senegal -0.531 -1.005 -6.304*** -6.651*** -0.934 -2.539 -6.392*** -6.316*** -1.544 -3.545* -2.427 -2.277 
Seychelles -3.149** -3.003 -7.251*** -7.308*** -3.135** -2.985 -7.066*** -7.132*** -5.342*** -5.282*** n.a n.a 
Sierra Leone -2.127 -1.534 -8.211*** -9.493*** -1.738 -1.628 -8.488*** -9.725*** -2.472 -2.335 -2.380 -2.424 
Sudan -1.201 -3.519* -5.354*** -4.802*** -1.478 -1.779 -5.843*** -5.873*** -1.686 -2.757 -2.758* -2.813 
Swaziland -3.978*** -2.327 -5.158*** -5.353*** -2.999** -2.337 -5.143*** -4.751*** 0.105 -2.112 -1.506 -9.394*** 
Togo -2.172 -2.227 -6.221*** -6.728*** -3.531** -3.238* n.a n.a -2.367 -3.489* -2.521 -2.461 
Tunisia -2.402 -4.300** -5.484*** -5.354*** -2.379 -2.936 -3.847*** -3.797** -0.958 -4.634*** -5.188*** -5.083*** 
Uganda -0.160 -4.807*** -6.668*** -6.541*** -0.819 -3.649** -4.977*** -4.866*** -2.961* -3.015 -1.804 -1.834 
Zambia -2.827* -1.636 -4.750*** -6.064*** -1.222 -2.265 -5.203*** -5.980*** 1.468 -1.659 -10.479*** -11.040*** 
Zimbabwe -2.347 -2.318 -5.426*** -5.378*** -3.385** -3.358* n.a n.a -2.016 -0.994 -4.318*** -0.505 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Maximum lag is 3 and optimal lags are chosen with  the AIC. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. n.a: not applicable; n.s.a: not 
specifically applicable due to issues in degrees of freedom.  
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4.3.2 Derivation of first orderly integrated variables and asymmetric panels 
Based on the country-specific unit root tests results, the choice of countries (in bold in 
Tables 1-2) that will constitute asymmetric investment panels is guided by the following 
criteria: 
-both factor productivity variables (human and physical capital) must exhibit unit root in level 
series and be first orderly integrated (first differenced stationarity); 
-at least one investment proxy must also be non stationary in level series and stationary in first 
differenced series.  
 In light of the above, the following asymmetric panels presented in Table 3 below are 
derived.  
 
Table 3: Derivation of countries with first orderly integrated variables:  I (1) 
Asymmetric Panels  
Investment dynamics Productivity factors 
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E Panel F 
FDI Private  Ivt Public Ivt Domestic Ivt.  Labour(Pop) Capital(GFCF) 
 
-Ivory Coast 
-Congo Rep. 
-Gambia 
-Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
-Zambia 
 
-Benin 
-Ivory Coast 
-Congo Rep. 
-Gambia 
-Ghana 
-Malawi 
-South Afri. 
-Sudan  
-Swaziland 
 
- Ivory Coast 
-Congo Rep. 
-Gambia 
-Ghana 
-Malawi 
 
-Sudan 
-Swaziland 
-Tunisia 
-Zambia 
 
 
-Ivory Coast 
-Congo Rep. 
 
-Ghana 
-Malawi 
-South Afri. 
-Sudan 
-Swaziland 
-Tunisia 
-Zambia 
-Benin 
-Ivory Coast 
-Congo Rep. 
-Gambia 
-Ghana 
-Malawi 
-South Afri. 
-Sudan  
-Swaziland 
-Tunisia 
-Zambia 
-Benin 
-Ivory Coast 
-Congo Rep. 
-Gambia 
-Ghana 
-Malawi 
-South Afri. 
-Sudan  
-Swaziland 
-Tunisia 
-Zambia  
Notes: FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Ivt: Investment. Pop: population. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation.  
Rep: Republic. Afri: Africa.  
 
 
4.4 Panel unit root tests 
 For every ‘investment dynamic and productivity factor’ pair, we assess evidence of 
stationarity using two types of first generational panel unit root tests. Like in the country-
specific unit root tests, when the variables exhibit unit roots in levels, we proceed to test for 
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stationarity in their first differences. Employment of the VECM requires that the variables 
have a unit root (or are non stationary) in level series. There are two main types of panel unit 
root tests: first generational (that supposes cross-sectional independence) and the second 
generational (based on cross-sectional dependence). A precondition for the use of the latter 
generational test is a cross-sectional dependence test which is applicable only if the number of 
cross-sections (N) in the panel is greater than the number of periods in the cross-sections (T). 
Given that we have 31 periods (T) and less than 11 cross-sections (N), we are compelled to 
focus on the first generational type. Accordingly, both the Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC, 2002) and 
Im, Pesaran & Shin (IPS, 2003) tests are applied. Whereas the former is a homogenous 
oriented panel unit root test (common unit as null hypothesis), the latter is a heterogeneous 
based test (individual unit roots as null hypotheses). When the results are different, IPS (2003) 
takes precedence over LLC (2002) in decision making because, in accordance with Maddala 
& Wu (1999), the alternative hypothesis of LLC (2002) is too strong. Consistent with Liew 
(2004), goodness of fit (or optimal lag selection) is ensured by the Hannan-Quinn Information 
Criterion (HQC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the LLC (2002) and IPS 
(2003) tests respectively. 
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Table 4: Panel unit root tests  
Panel A 
Unit root tests for factor-foreign investment productivity 
Deterministic 
components  
LLC  tests for homogenous panel IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
FDI Labour Capital FDI Labour Capital 
Level  c 1.616 1.866 0.155 1.257 2.783 -0.304 
ct 0.019 3.318 -1.355* -1.644* -2.752*** -1.618* 
First 
difference 
 c -12.552*** -11.474*** -8.412*** -13.385*** -6.898*** -8.896*** 
ct -11.130*** -13.721*** -8.210*** -11.880*** -13.353*** -8.673*** 
Number of  cross sections involved are five :Ivory Coast, Congo Republic, The Gambia, Ghana and Zambia 
 
Panel B 
Unit root tests  for factor-private investment productivity 
Deterministic 
components 
LLC  tests for homogenous panel IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
Private Ivt. Labour Capital Private Ivt. Labour Capital 
Level  c -2.722*** 1.230 -0.201 -0.855 1.519 -0.926 
ct -2.528*** 4.309 -2.764*** -1.828** -2.341*** -2.825*** 
First 
difference 
 c -2.722*** -11.476*** -10.336*** -14.598*** -6.535*** -12.872*** 
ct -2.528*** -14.828*** -8.263*** -11.455*** -13.519*** -11.859*** 
Number of  cross sections involved are nine :Benin, Ivory Coast, Congo Republic, The Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, 
South Africa, Sudan and Swaziland 
 
Panel C 
Unit root tests  for factor-public investment productivity 
Deterministic 
components 
LLC  tests for homogenous panel IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
Public Invt. Labour Capital Public invt. Labour Capital 
Level  c -1.297* 2.312 -1.207 -2.518*** 2.702 -1.383* 
ct 0.996 4.449 -1.763** 0.353 -3.314*** -1.457* 
First 
difference 
 c -11.917*** -11.508*** -11.360*** -10.752*** -7.500*** -12.293*** 
ct -9.757*** -15.006*** -9.446*** -9.628*** -14.449*** -11.375*** 
Number of  cross sections involved are nine :Ivory Coast, Congo Republic, The Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tunisia and Zambia 
 
Panel D 
Unit root tests  for factor-domestic investment productivity 
Deterministic 
components 
LLC  tests for homogenous panel IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
GDI Labour Capital GDI Labour Capital 
Level  c -2.364*** 2.191 -1.573* -1.920** 2.873 -0.842 
ct -2.485*** 7.005 -1.1350 -1.500* -3.596*** -0.347 
First 
difference 
 c -2.364*** -13.551*** -10.768*** -12.635*** -8.524*** -11.654*** 
ct -1.752** -14.724*** -9.114*** -11.866*** -13.646*** -10.826*** 
Number  of cross sections involved are nine :Ivory Coast, Congo Republic, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia and Zambia 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Maximum lag is 3 and optimal lags are chosen via HQC for LLC test and 
AIC for IPS test. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. Invt: Investment. GDI: Gross Domestic  Investment. LLC: 
Levin, Lin & Chu (2002). IPS: Im, Pesaran & Shin (2003).  
 
 From Table 4  above, it could be observed that, but for factor-domestic investment 
(Panel D) which significantly has variables void of unit root in level series (with GDI 
significant under both deterministic assumptions), the other three factor-investment variable-
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panels are first orderly integrated. According to the Engle & Granger (1987) theorem, when 
variables are integrated, a linear combination among them could be stationary (cointegration).  
 
4.5 Panel cointegration tests 
   According to the cointegration theory, two or more variables that exhibit unit root in 
levels may have a linear combination in a long-run (or equilibrium). In other words, we 
examine whether permanent long-run movements of factor productivity indicators affect 
permanent long-run investment dynamics. To achieve this, we examine the presence of 
cointegration among integrated variables with the Engle-Granger based Pedroni and Kao 
tests. Borrowing from Camarero & Tamarit (2002), the advantage of applying these two tests 
is that, while the former (Pedroni, 1999) is heterogeneous, the latter (Kao, 1999) is 
homogenous-based. Implementation of both tests is compatible with our earlier application of 
both homogenous (LLC) and heterogeneous (IPS) panel unit root tests. The same 
deterministic trend components used in integration tests are applied. Contrary to mainstream 
literature in which cointegration relations are based on multivariate statistics (Gries et al., 
2009), to avoid misspecifications in causality estimations, we present both trivariate and 
bivariates tests but base our decisions on the latter. Optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is 
by the AIC.  
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Table 5: Bivariate and trivariate panel cointegration tests  
Panel A 
Cointegration tests for factor-foreign investment productivity 
 FDI, Labour, Capital FDI, Labour FDI, Capital 
Deterministic trend specifications c ct c ct c ct 
Engle-Granger based Pedroni test  for heterogeneous panel 
-Panel PP Statistics -1.003 -1.410* -2.500*** -3.388*** -0.278 -2.198** 
-Panel  ADF Statistics -2.233** -2.701*** -3.008*** -3.268*** -1.021 -3.335*** 
-Group  PP  Statistics -0.754 -1.976** -1.706** -2.927*** 0.943 -2.345*** 
-Group  ADF Statistics -2.112** -3.223*** -1.716** -2.559*** -0.479 -2.425*** 
Engle-Granger based Kao test  for homogenous panel 
-ADF t statistics 1.916** n.a 2.031** n.a 3.125*** n.a 
 
Panel B 
Cointegration tests for factor-private investment productivity 
 Private I, Labour, Capital Private I, Labour Private  I, Capital 
Deterministic trend specifications c ct c ct c ct 
Engle-Granger based Pedroni test  for heterogeneous panel 
-Panel PP Statistics -2.799*** -2.861*** -1.380* -1.273 -3.729*** -1.873** 
-Panel  ADF Statistics -2.854*** -2.475*** -1.953** -3.008*** -3.850*** -3.245*** 
-Group  PP  Statistics -3.277*** -3.028*** -1.750** -2.393*** -3.966*** -2.210** 
-Group  ADF Statistics -3.754*** -2.678*** -2.337*** -4.031*** -4.978*** -2.348*** 
Engle-Granger based Kao test  for homogenous panel 
-ADF t statistics -4.399*** n.a 0.327 n.a -4.366*** n.a 
 
Panel C 
Cointegration tests for factor-public  investment productivity 
 Public I, Labour, Capital Public I, Labour Public I, Capital 
Deterministic trend specifications c ct c ct c ct 
Engle-Granger based Pedroni test  for heterogeneous panel 
-Panel PP Statistics -1.530* -1.347* 1.481 -0.844 -1.347* -2.031** 
-Panel  ADF Statistics -2.670** -3.231*** 0.771 -3.147*** -1.506* -3.164*** 
-Group  PP  Statistics -1.575* -3.331*** 2.891 0.323 -0.808 -3.320*** 
-Group  ADF Statistics -3.738*** -4.426*** 2.127 -12.24*** -1.718** -3.841*** 
Engle-Granger based Kao test  for homogenous panel  
-ADF t statistics -1.971** n.a -4.147*** n.a -2.066** n.a 
 
Panel D 
Cointegration tests for factor-domestic  investment productivity 
N/A due to presence of level stationarity in key variables 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Maximum lag is 3 and optimal lags are chosen by  the AIC. 
N/A (n.a): Not Applicable. . PP: Phillips-Perron. ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller. 
 
Table 5 above reports the findings of the cointegration tests. There is evidence of 
cointegration between factor productivity variables and three investment indicators (foreign, 
private and public investments). It is interesting to note that, the domestic investment variable 
and factor productivity variables were not overwhelmingly integrated due to the presence of 
level stationarity in a key variable (domestic investment). Hence, while domestic investment 
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and factor productivity variables (which have not been objects of any cointegration tests) will 
only be subject to short-run causality analysis, the other ‘investment-factor productivity’ pairs 
will be object of both short-term and long-run causality analysis.   
 
4.6 Panel causality analysis 
 
 Table 6 below presents the results of the causality analysis. While the VECM is 
specified in level equations, Granger causality is in first difference representation. Optimal lag 
selection for goodness of fit in the VAR models is ensured by the AIC with three maximum 
lags. The F-statistics is for the joint significance of lagged values of independent variables. 
The Error Correction Terms (ECTs) represent short-run adjustments to the cointegration 
(long-run) relationships. Note should be taken of the fact that, physical capital is used as a 
control variable for robustness check in order to control for the ‘physical capital-led 
investment hypothesis (nexus)’.  
 
Table 6: Empirical results of panel causality analysis 
 
 
Asymmetric 
panels 
Goodness of fit  in VAR 
models 
Prime concern Robustness checks 
Labour led  Investment Capital led  Investment 
1
st
 dif. Level Short 
run 
(1
st
 dif.) 
Long 
run(level) 
Short run 
(1
st
 dif.) 
Long run(level) 
Max(AIC) Max(AIC):CE F-Statsª ECT(t-stats) º F-Statsª ECT(t-stats) º 
Foreign  
Investment 
3(3)/ 3(3) 3(1):1/ 3(3):1 3.021** 0.0001 
(1.565) 
0.521 0.225*** 
(2.983) 
       
Private 
Investment 
3(3)/3(3) 3(3):1/3(1) :1 1.793 -0.002 
(-1.187) 
0.350 0.253*** 
(4.573) 
       
Public  
Investment 
3(3)/3(3) 3(2):1/3(1) :1 1.332 0.003*** 
(5.228) 
1.467 -0.230*** 
(-3.723) 
       
Domestic 
Investment 
3(3)/3(3) n.a 0.436 s.l 2.673** s.l 
ª (F-Stats) F-statistics (Wald statistics) test the significance of lagged values of the endogenous variables. ° (ECT/t-stats) Error Correction 
term and t-ratios. Asterisks indicate the following levels of significance:***, 1%;**; 5% and *; 10%. Maximum lag is 3 and optimal lags are 
chosen via AIC. s.l and n.a indicate “stationary at level” and “not applicable” respectively. 1st dif: First difference. Max: Maximun. CE: 
Cointegrating Equation. VAR: Vector Auto Regression.  
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4.6 Discussion of results, policy implications, caveats and future directions  
 
 From the cointegration results, it could be observed that but for domestic investment; 
there are long-term equilibriums between population growth and other forms of investments. 
This implies permanent demographic changes affect permanent changes in investment 
dynamics and vice-versa. However, the correlation does not imply causation. A detailed 
analysis of short-run dynamics corresponding to the long-run equilibriums (cointegrating 
relationships) reveal a significant positive causal linkage from population growth to only 
public investment. This positive sign of the ECT is not unexpected. A broader interpretation 
of the long-term elasticity follows: a 1% change in population growth will lead to 0.3% 
change in per capita public investment. If public investment is considered as a transmission 
channel to economic growth, then this result is consistent with the population-growth led 
economic-growth nexus (Hondroyiannis & Papapetrou, 2005; Azomahou & Mishra, 2008). 
 Granger causality flowing from population growth to foreign investment in the short-
run is in line with the predictions of economic theory. An increase in population has the 
tendency to induce positive expectations from entrepreneurs as they turn to believe certain 
investments will be profitable; either by means of higher demand for commodities or cheap 
labour supply. With this optimism, investment and unemployment correspondingly increases 
and decreases respectively. This optimism is merely relative to foreign investment. It is also 
interesting to broadly infer that, the overwhelming absence of Granger causality flowing from 
population to other forms of investment is also consistent with the predictions of economic 
theory which stipulate that, population growth affects economic growth only in the long-run. 
This inference is based on the assumption that, the other investment dynamics are exogenous 
to economic prosperity.  
 The robustness checks have aimed to assess the causal link flowing from physical 
capital to aggregate investment dynamics. The interest of this side of analysis is to control for 
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the ‘physical-capital led investment’ nexus. From a short-run perspective, but for the 
significance of the relationship with domestic investment, other insignificant results were 
expected. Regarding adjustments to the long-run equilibrium, but for public investment (that 
is significant with an unexpected negative sign), the remaining ECTs (short-run dynamics) are 
significantly positive. This is sound empirical justification of or robustness to the ‘physical-
capital’ led investment nexus.  
 One important finding of this work worth emphasizing is that, in the long-run 
population growth would only deplete public finance through increasing public investments. 
Therefore, demographic policies in sampled countries should be focused towards family 
planning and birth control. These would ensure that human capital variations through 
demographic change grow concurrently with the public investments necessary to 
accommodate the rising unemployment. A corollary to this implication invites the speeding- 
up of the privatization process in sampled countries; so that, increasing long-term 
unemployment (arising from population growth) should be accommodated with the 
corresponding private sector investments. In other words, governments would still play a 
crucial role in economic investment in a distant future if measures are not taken to either: (1) 
address existing trends of rising demographic change or; (2) encourage a positive investment 
climate and ease of doing business that will provide incentives for private and foreign 
investments.  
 As observed in the literature section, with structural adjustment policies (of 
liberalization, privatization and meandering towards market-based-economies imposed by the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund on most sampled African countries), we 
expected a significant positive long-run causality to flow from population growth to foreign 
and private investments on the one hand, and less positive correlations with public 
investments on the other hand. This implies, much still has to be done to attract foreign and 
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private investors. Moreover, public spending would still play a great role in economic 
investments in the future. Consequently, from a population growth standpoint, it could be 
inferred that, structural adjustments policies implemented by sampled countries may not have 
the desired investment effects in the long-term.  
To the best of our knowledge, the absence of literature dedicated to examining the 
bearing of demographic change on investment dynamics makes our results less comparable. 
However our findings are broadly consistent with the need for other forms of investments 
documented in the African business literature (Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Alagidede, 2008; 
Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi , 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Darley, 2012; Asongu, 2012c).  In 
this paper, we have only considered demographic determinants of investment. But in the real 
world, investment is endogenous to a complex set of variables. From a wider perspective, the 
link between population growth and investment is an essential part of a certain broader 
phenomenon. It is scarcely possible to conceive this linkage as occurring in isolation because; 
they are intimately bound with other factors (like technological change and progress in health 
care). Hence, it would be interesting to replicate the analysis in a multivariate VAR context. 
Another interesting future research direction could be to assess whether the findings apply to 
country-specific cases. Moreover, another future research direction could entail analyzing the 
human capital factor in productivity from an age-dynamic perspective, so that a better account 
of investment-factor productivity (with respect to age-structured work-force is brought to 
light). Our analysis is entirely limited to the quantity of labour force. However, we believe a 
parallel analysis based on the quality of labour force with parameters like health and type of 
secondary education (amongst others), could provide more insights into this phenomenon. 
Measuring skills would be quit challenging, so we recommend Lall (1990)  for a unique 
opportunity to provide first-hand account by building a proxy using school attainments at the 
primary and secondary levels or any other proxy in future analysis.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
  Our generation is experiencing the greatest demographic transition and Africa is at the 
center of it. There is mounting concern over corresponding rising unemployment and 
depleting per capita income. We have examined the issues in this paper from a long-run 
perspective by assessing the relationships among population growth and a plethora of 
investment dynamics: public, private, foreign and domestic investments. Using asymmetric 
panels from 38 countries with data spanning from 1977 to 2007, our findings have revealed a 
long-run positive causal linkage from population growth to only public investment. But for 
domestic investment, permanent fluctuations in human capital affect permanent changes in 
other forms of investments. Robustness checks on corresponding short-run Granger causality 
analysis and the long-run ‘physical capital led investment’ nexus have been consistent with 
the predictions of economic theory. As a policy implication, population growth may strangle 
only public finances in the long-run. Hence, the need for measures that encourage family 
planning and create a conducive investment climate (and ease of doing business) for private 
and foreign investments. Seemingly, structural adjustments policies implemented by sampled 
countries may not have the desired investment effects in the distant future.  
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